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THE SCIENTIFIC AND HUMANE STUDY
OF CRIMINAL LAW*
JEROME HALL**

Criminal law is a perennial plant of ancient origin, found everywhere.
It is not uprooted even by the most violent revolutions. For when the
catastrophic changes have run their rapid course, the elementary needs
of daily life must be attended to and the place of law in the affairs of men
receives a measure of the attention that its importance merits. By any
standard one may select with reference to law-the security of life and
property, the honest conduct of trade, public education, the intellectual
character of the problems, dramatic interest and, certainly not last in
importance, justice among men-it is the law of crimes and criminal
procedure which holds the central position, even if that is not appreciated in most American law schools. We are especially challenged in
these latter decades of the twentieth century by the volume of crime in
this country as well as by the hazards of living in an emerging international community, to advance our knowledge of criminal law and
improve its effectiveness.
We are accustomed to look first, and not without reason, to scientific
theories to solve our problems. A scientific theory is to be contrasted
with other meanings of that term. For example, the professional literature contains references to "theories" of punishment, which consist of
opinions on that subject, supported by more or less persuasive data.
Again, what has been called a "finalistic theory" of penal law by European scholars is a general interpretation of criminal law. More significant is the use of the term "theory" to refer to the knowledge of certain
common aspects of criminal law, e.g., its division into specific rules and
general conceptions, and of common elements of crimes, e.g., an objective
element, a subjective element connotating fault, and that of legality.
None of these uses of the term, however, expresses the meaning of
* This lecture was given in Boston on April 2, 1962, inaugurating the series of
lectures on Criminal Law to be given annually under the auspices of Boston
University School of Law.
** Distinguished Service Professor of Law, Indiana University; Visiting Professor,
University of London, 1954-55; Visiting Professor, University of Freiburg, Second
Term, 1961. Author of Theft, Law and Society (2d ed. 1952) ; General Principles
of Criminal Law (2d ed. 1960) ; Living Law of Democratic Society (1949);
Studies in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory (1958) and other books;-Editor,
20th Century Legal Philosophy Series (7 vols.).
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"theory" in the current philosophy of science. A theory of physics, e.g.,
refers to a system of ideas, an organization of propositions so interrelated that the terms are defined by reference to each other. It is this
attribute of physics which renders it rigorously scientific, permitting deductive manipulation; and this is extremely important because of the
nature of physical data. Without extending the analogy unduly, therefore, the theory of criminal law to be presented here may be said to share
this characteristic of being systematic.
In terms of this theory, criminal law consists of propositions of three
very different types, each serving essential functions. These propositions
are expressed as rules, doctrines, and principles, and each represents
progressively wider generalization.'
The rules, the relatively narrowest of these propositions, have two
functions. First, they state what is unique in each crime. If, e.g., one
wishes to know in what respects larceny, embezzlement, murder, treason
and so oil differ from each other, one consults the rules of criminal
law. Second, the rules contain such terms as "any person" and also,
various verbs such as "takes," "kills" and so on.
But the rules do not define the whole of any crime, and to provide the
entire definition, it is necessary to qualify all the above and similar
terms by adding to the rules the more general propositions designated
"doctrines." '2 The doctrines concern infancy, insanity, intoxication,
coercion, necessity, ignorance of fact and law, attempt, solicitation, conspiracy and complicity. The need to add the doctrines to the rules in
order to define the various crimes is evident by reference to insanity or
infancy. For, plainly, the definition of larceny, arson and so on in terms
of the rules is incomplete since these crimes were not committed if the
doer was insane or an infant. What is obvious in these instances is also
true of the other doctrines. The doctrines thus supply essential elements
that are common in the definition of crimes.
Finally, if one examines this union of the rules and the doctrines with
a view to discovering general conceptions running through this body of
criminal law, he derives seven fundamental notions-the principles of
criminal law, namely, mens rea, act (manifested effort), the "concurrence," (fusion), of these two to form criminal conduct, the harm, the

causal connection between conduct and harm, the punitive sanction
(punishment) and, finally, legality. Thus mens rea represents what is
common in all the particular mental states specified in the rules, qualified
by the relevant doctrines-insanity, infancy, coercion and so on. So,
1 Attention is called to the diagram at the end of this paper.

2 For civilian readers, it should be noted that "doctrine" does not have the
meaningto which they are accustomed. As the following text shows, "doctrine"
refers to certain propositions of intermediate generality.
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too, punishment represents what is common in all the prescribed
sanctions, and so on as to the other principles. Since these principles are
the ultimate conceptions of penal law, they are the notions in terms of
which "crime" is defined; hence the lack of any one of the seven principles means that the relevant datum is not a crime. Lastly, it may be
noted that the principles can be given normative form as the most
general propositions of penal law; and they may also be stated descriptively to comprise the basic generalizations of a science of criminal
law.
In sum, doctrines differ from principles, first, in that doctrines are essential to the definition of crimes while principles are not. Second,
principles are much wider generalizations than are doctrines, as may
readily be seen if, e.g., the doctrine of insanity is compared with the
principle of mens rea or the doctrine of attempt is compared with the
principle of harm. Third, while the doctrines are general qualifiers of
the rules, the principles are the ultimate common conceptions running
through this combined totality of rules and doctrines.
There is another interrelationship of these concepts which is also essential in the definition of the principles and, therefore, is that of the
specific crimes, namely, a postulated teleological relationship between
criminal conduct and harm. In other words, in this theory, criminal
conduct is the means employed to effect the harm-the end sought or
hazarded; hence each conception must be defined by reference to the
other one. So, too, the rational relation of the punitive sanction to the
harm brings the sanction into a like relation with the criminal conduct.
Finally, the principle of causation, the causal nexus between criminal
conduct and harm, signifies cause in the primary, teleological sense of
end-seeking, not in that of mechanical causation, although the latter is, of
course, assumed to operate in the physical world in which a rational
actor causes changes to occur. As suggested, this teleological relationship between the principles is reflected in the meaning of the various
crimes, i.e., each instance of criminal conduct is the particular means
employed to produce a specific harm.
Because this theory is teleological, it excludes from the criminal law
negligent damage and, obviously, conduct that is presently subjected to
strict penal liability. This is only the culmination of the long history of
advanced legal systems from strict criminal liability to a law which progressively narrowed criminal liability to-voluntary harm-doing. That
seems clearly to have been the trend of Anglo-American criminal
law, and a well-known English scholar states that excepting, perhaps,
nuisance and libel, "it should now be recognized that at common law
8'
there is no criminal liability for harm thus caused by inadvertence."
3

Turner, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law 29 (1952).
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The principal reason for excluding negligent damage from criminal
liability is, of course, an ethical one.4 It is that such liability should be
based on moral culpability and that implies action, i.e., voluntarily harming a human being. Even if a wider view of morality is taken, the punishment of a human being is so serious a matter that it should be limited
to what, in that view, is the grosser sort of immorality expressed in
voluntary harm-doing. This is the central truth of Western ethics
dating from Plato and Aristotle, it is the heart of Kant's ethics, and it
is recognized as well in Oriental ethics. The merit of this principle is
tacitly admitted in most of the arguments supporting penal liability for
negligent damage. For these advocates consciously or implicitly assimilate that to voluntary harm-doing or they find harmful action somewhere along the causal line. The hard fact is that inadvertence is not
awareness;. on the contrary, where the one is, the other is not.
Holmes said that even a dog understands the difference between being
kicked and being stumbled over, but sophisticated philosophers and
persons taken with a psychiatric ideology find reasons to challenge this
elementary fact. They assert that there is no important difference between (voluntary) action and (inadvertent) behavior or that psychiatry
has established the invalidity of this distinction. This is a phase of a
philosophy which views all conduct as determined and, I believe, the
fallacy of that has been sufficiently demonstrated. One need only recall
that this theory is self-defeating because if all conduct is determined,
the theory is itself determined and thus can make no claims to objective
truth.
Such psychological persuasiveness as this theory may have probably
derives from an increased awareness that emotional drives, adverse conditioning and the consequent misinterpretation of situations produce
strong, frequently unconscious motives for criminal conduct. The ethical-legal principle, however, does not imply any innocence of these
factors, and the doctrines of ignorance of fact, infancy, insanity, coercion, and so on, as well as the discretion of courts and parole boards
comprise the legal basis for a thorough consideration of them. These
doctrines and practices do imply that all is not chaos and unreason but,
instead, that there are truths about an orderly world as well as an essential difference between thinking about it and not thinking,, between
awareness and inadvertence, between conduct and behavior. This difference is a fact of life which no amount of sophistication can dissolve.
Legal scholars who advocate the punishment of negligent persons have
4 This is discussed in the writer's General Principles of Criminal Law (2d ed.
1960) and in his supplementary paper prepared for the meeting of the Association
Internationale de Droit P6nal, Lisbon, September, 1961, to be published in a forthcoming issue of Rev. Intrn'l de Dr. Pen.
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not, to my knowledge, argued that this should extend to negligent misrepresentation, negligently burning a house, negligently taking other
persons' property and so on; and, obviously, many difficult problems
would be met in any consistent effort to do that. These scholars have,
instead, supported certain statutes and the vestiges of criminal liability
for negligent damage in various corners of penal law, either in deference
to the opinion of legislators, which is really an abdication of critical
judgment, or because they believe the punishment of negligent persons
has a deterrent effect. Is there, however, any evidence to support this
opinion? Such arguments are also apt to confuse negligence with recklessness and to omit any discussion of the relevance of the fact that the
deterrent thesis rests on the premise that a prospective criminal will
weigh the advantage of his crime against the disadvantage of his more
or less probable punishment. If he has the sanction in mind, his conduct is reckless when he acts in a dangerous manner. If he does not
have the sanction in mind, how can he be deterred? Conceivably, it
might be possible to show that there is some sort of carry-over from
punishment for negligence to increased sensitivity, knowledge and skill.
But the proponents of penal liability for negligence have not referred
to any relevant data despite the fact that the preponderant insistence of
the common law on fecklessness places a heavy burden of proof upon
them. Certainly, the analogy of correcting children daily and on the
spot would be far-fetched.
What we frequently have in inadvertent damage is an insensitivity
to danger, including that to the negligent person himself. It is a character defect that is probably the product of long conditioning. Accordingly, the argument that these persons "violate their duty in being indifferent to other persons' interests" is ambiguous in the crucial respects
relevant to a sound determination of the issue, namely, as regards the
meaning of "violate" and "duty." There is a very important difference
between the failure to realize potential values-and every thoughtful
person recognizes, sometimes painfully, that he falls short of the idealand voluntarily harming a human being. The restriction of criminal
liability to voluntary, i.e., intentional or reckless harm-doing, would also
clarify the public mind regarding crime and the functions of penal law.
This, of course, does not imply that the community should not protect
itself from the damage caused by ignorant, awkward or insensitive persons. On the contrary, it should employ all social measures which prevent the damage directly or reach the causes of such dangerous behavior. Stricter licensing and revocation of licenses, the use of administrative boards and educational programs are among the relevant social
resources. A solution is not easily found or applied. But in any case,
whatever doubts one may have regarding the efficacy of these measures,
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it is clear that punishment must rest upon positive moral grounds, not
on the uncertainty of non-punitive measures.
The theory of criminal law presented here has been discussed in various places, and the principal issue raised in Continental countries and
in others which derive their legal codes from them concerns its exclusion of negligence from criminal fault. Since Continental and derivative codes impose such criminal liability, typically in a few special
provisions, the criticism is that negligent behavior is criminal in these
instances, yet the above theory does not include that within its orbit.
There is no unanimous Continental position on this issue, but it probably
does mark one of the greatest divergencies between the principal thrust
of Anglo-American criminal law and Continental and derivative criminal law. The question is being discussed in many countries and it was
one of the four topics on the program of the recent Lisbon meeting of
the Association Internationale de Droit P6nal-indications that there
is some doubt among Continental and other scholars about their current
law.
This criticism of the theory here presented raises a question of science,
indeed, of understanding anything, and especially of the limitations of
descriptive theories as well as their advantage over formal theories. 5
Formal theories of criminal law generalize regarding everything labeled
a "crime" in the code and statutes, no matter how fortuitous, arbitrary
or archaic, and they, therefore, confuse or obscure very important differences. It seems inevitable that many unfortunate consequences result
especially because voluntary harm-doing and inadvertent damage are
subsumed in a single equivocal term (fault, Schuld, culpa) suggesting
that the entire penal law is based on moral culpability. At the same time,
judges speculate on whether defendants "could have" used due care,
and the principle of legality is correspondingly weakened.
A theory of law is not invalid because it does not include adventitious,
irrational commands within its orbit in such a way as to make it seem
that they are the same kind of data that rational laws comprise. A descriptive theory of law represents knowledge of that law, and the fact
that in practice and in certain existing codes, negligent damage is held
criminal does not prove that a theory which fits only voluntary harmdoing is invalid. It only means that it cannot consistently include the
inadvertent behavior which is held criminal in those codes. That prosecutions are initiated, convictions rendered and sentences served for
negligent damage, where the current penal law so provides, is well
known, as is the fact that, in practice, lawyers must occasionally deal
with very arbitrary "commands of the Sovereign." But the merit of a
5

Discussed in Hall, Studies in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory, ch. 1

(1958).

CRIMINAL LAW
descriptive theory as contrasted with formal ones is that it provides the
practitioner with the only knowledge by reference to which he can determine his objective and fix his strategy. If, e.g., he is a prosecutor,
it clarifies the nature of what he needs to establish and what he does
not need to establish under the current law while defense counsel is
equipped to examine current law critically, oppose the expansion of
unsound law and, of course, participate effectively in a pre-sentence
hearing. If, in sum, we have knowledge of the most important part of
penal codes and statutes, and refrain from attributing the qualities of
those laws to other parts of the codes and statutes which refer to essentially different kinds of data, we secure a solid vantage point from which
those currently accepted "crimes" can be soundly analyzed. If, in addition, it therefore becomes possible to state our knowledge systematically
in terms of the interrelations of a set of realistic ultimate ideas, we have
laid the foundations for fruitful legal and criminological research.
Differences of opinion, which may be expected to persist regarding
penal policies, do not alter the nature of knowledge of crime and criminal law. If, as appears evident, it is impossible to produce a descriptive'
theory which subsumes both voluntary harm-doing and inadvertent
damage in a coherent set of realistic terms, the only alternative-if that
is possible-is to add a persuasive theory of the penalization of negligent
damage to a theory limited to voluntary harm-doing. Not the least
benefit of attempts to provide a theory dealing with negligence in terms
of its actual characteristics would be to reveal more clearly the grounds
upon which such penal liability is based.
In sum, the theory of criminal law presented here builds first upon
the core of criminal law, on what is universally recognized as criminal.
It thus subsumes the most important part of the present criminal law
of all advanced societies and applies as well to minor crimes which conform to the principles specified in the theory. The theory abstracts these
essential attributes and organizes them in a system of interrelated propositions. It implies a moral basis for penal liability and thus, among
other consequences, it opens a very large area of behavior that is presently held criminal, under some codes, to non-punitive treatment. The
theory is realistic in its reference to facts and values since it refers to
actual conduct, actual harms and real values. It reveals the interrelated
significance of hitherto isolated propositions and problems and provides
a set of tools which can be used effectively in the analysis of problems
of penal law.
Since the theory is descriptive and normative, it implies that empirical
studies and ethical critiques will be carried on to give it maximum significance. The salient advantage in this regard is that the theory reveals
the precise relevance of such research and facilitates the systematic
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accumulation of the increased knowledge. Since the theory is focused
on human conduct, implying personal actors and the mental states they
exhibit, on the harms they cause and on the punitive measures that are
applied, it is evident that the relevant knowledge is to be found in
psychology, sociology and ethics incorporated into socio-legal disciplines.
The normal psychology of the universities is often viewed as a biophysical science, and the principal subject matter of the social discipline
has thus been ignored. To assume that the mind is a mythical ghost-inthe-machine may be an apt hypothesis for some purposes: But it does
not lead to knowledge relevant to the problem of determining, e.g.,
whether a particular person intended to commit a proscribed harm or
which degree of criminal homicide was committed. Nor is it very helpful in guiding the wise determination of a sentence, which must take
account of the personality of the offender. Fortunately, there has been
developing in some departments an integrative view of normal personality which opens the door to a humanistic psychology that is
relevant to criminal law. 6 So, too, some promising studies on the
psychology of evidence have been initiated at various times; but these
have not been carried forward. The psychology of joint criminality,
normal suggestibility, racial and cultural animosity operative among
gangs and in juvenile delinquency, and many other important aspects
of normal psychology also remain unexplored and unadapted to the
problem of criminal law.
While normal legal psychology has been neglected, psychiatry has
enjoyed a phenomenal development. It is a curious and thought-provoking fact that in no other country in the world has psychiatry assumed
the gargantuan proportions attained in the United States. Nor is the
propaganda of rich psychiatric institutions carried on elsehere to any
degree remotely approaching that in this country. There are, presumably,
many reasons to account for this American phenomenon in addition
to the large number of psychiatrists. But they do not dispel troublesome doubts about some aspects of the practice of psychiatry. Certainly
no lawyer can view with equanimity the disintegration of the moral
foundations of the criminal law, by the propaganda of irresponsibility
and the irresponsible expansion of the concept of "mental disease." Nor
is there much comfort to be derived from the business of trying to
persuade Americans that they are mentally disordered and that, no
matter how wise they are, they may be impotent to control themselves
even with regard to committing the most serious crimes of violence.
Although there have been many searching surveys of the legal profession, apparently no one has asked why one of the large foundations
6 E.g., Allport, Becoming-Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality -(1955).
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has not subsidized 'such a study to determine the facts and to' evaluate
the current practices of the psychiatric profession especially in large
institutions.
It is unfortunate that the serious challenge of extremist psychiatric
philosophers has diverted us from a thorough investigation of the valid
uses of psychiatry in criminal law and we are therefore far from having
a sound forensic psychiatry. We must nonetheless face the other side
of this important question-the fact that many very important advances
have been made by psychiatry. We therefore have a difficult dual task
-to make use of this knowledge of personality and conduct and at the
same time prevent some Very articulate psychiatrists from imposing their
philosophy of life upon the nation.
To achieve these objectives, what needs first of all to be recognized,
especially by psychiatrists, is that moral obligation and attendant legal
responsibility are not medical questions. They are ethical, legal questions; and in a democracy, the premise is that the relevant policies are
best determined in free discussion by intelligent laymen. I do not mean
to imply that psychiatric knowledge and the facts discovered about the
personality of accused persons are not relevant to the legal issues. They
are indeed both relevant and extremely important. What I have in mind
are such questions as the following: Does it make sense for an intelligent
person to talk about "right" and "wrong" and "moral obligation"?
Ought normal adults who voluntarily commit harms proscribed by penal
law be punished? What is fair or just punishment? Should only
psychotic persons be absolved from penal liability or should every sociopath and the vast additional numbers who have any kind or degree of
"mental defect"-assuming' these terms have defensible meaning-also
be excused from penal liability?
Equally important is the fact that the questions whether a person is
normal and whether a person is so abnormal as to be labelled "psychotic" are not questions regarding which psychiatrists have any expert
knowledge. On the contrary, as regards these questions, psychiatrists
are no better qualified to pass judgment than is an ordinary clerk or
policeman, as one psychiatrist put it.7 Their expert functions lie in
other directions.
Some scholars, including sociologists who usually favor the wide
use of social science, have argued that it is a. mistake to allow psychiatrists to testify as expert witnesses, that psychiatry has not advanced to the point of warranting the current practice. 8 Although this
7 Redlich, Interrelations Between the Social Environment and Psychiatric
Disorders 120 (Milbank Mem. Fund, 1953).
8 Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction,
23 L. & Contemp. Prob. 681 (1958) ; LaPiere, The Freudian Ethic 176-77 (1959).
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position is understandable in the light of exaggerated claims to scientific
status, it does not take account of important advances made in psychiatry. For example, in revealing the actual personality of a defendant,
the depth and influence of his emotions and drives, in unmasking disguised motives and rationalizations, in describing the development of
mental disorder in conflict situations, and in making available new
methods of research, psychiatry has contributed much valuable knowledge. It is not the rigorously organized and objectively verified knowledge found in physical science but is more like the informed insight
which an art critic or an experienced doctor acquires through practice.
In bringing this kind of knowledge to the attention of judges and
juries, able psychiatrists can help them appraise the defendant's personality and conduct correctly. They can assist courts in pre-sentence
hearings to determine sentences wisely.9 And if enough competent
psychiatrists were employed in institutions, they could probably raise
the level of peno-correctional treatment although that is by no means
as certain as we are often led to believe. It is especially in these very
large areas that there can be fruitful cooperation between the psychiatric
and the legal professions.
I have been discussing the relevance of normal psychology and psychiatry for the principles of criminal law which are represented by the
composite conception of criminal conduct. If we attend, next, to the
harms produced by criminal conduct, we enter the domain of the
sociology of criminal law.' 0 As the teleological import of the theory
makes evident, however, harm and conduct and likewise, therefore,
social situation and personality are intimately inter-connected. Hence
the prevalent separation of psychology, especially clinical psychiatry,
from sociology is unfortunate and retards the development of the kind
of knowledge that is needed, including a socially oriented forensic
psychiatry, i.e., knowledge that is relevant to the principles of criminal
law.
The study of criminal harms also involves problems of values no
less than does that of criminal conduct. Indeed, it is only when the
harm is brought into defensible relation with the relevant conduct that
the latter becomes morally significant. What is presupposed in one
fashion or another is the existence of values as the condition of their
being harmed and also as the condition of the evaluation of voluntary
harm-doing. So, too, any view of punishment as a rational measure
implies a theory of values. The pervasiveness of value through all the
9 For a discussion of the merits in this respect of the Model Sentencing Act
drafted by the Advisory Council of Judges of the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, see Rubin, A New Approach to M'Naghten v. Durham, 45 J.
Am. Jud. Soc'y 133 (1961).
10 Hall, Theft, Law and Society (2d ed. 1952).
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focal points indicated in the theory influences the construction of relevant
social disciplines to take account of the quality of the data of penal
law. At the same time, extant contributions show that the humane
study of criminal law does not handicap its scientific study. Instead,
the two go hand in hand, each supplementing the kind of knowledge
the other supplies regarding the essential components of penal law
designated by the principles.
Crimes against property are an obvious instance of the need to study
relevant social situations if the various harms are tobe understood. For
example, whether we'deal with the larceny of automobiles, furs and
jewelry or with receiving stolen property, fraud and other property
offenses, the professional conduct of illegitimate business is distinguishable from other types of criminal conduct. What is evident in these
crimes applies to all other types of criminality-they, too, occur in,
and are influenced by, certain environments and situations. Homicide
and incest, e.g., tend to be committed more frequently in certain types
of situation than in others. Joint criminality by gangs is accentuated in
certain neighborhoods; and the typical conditions of all the other
offenses could be similarly recognized. The causal problems are diverse
as are those of prevention, treatment and punishment. So, too, the
soundness and precision of legislation are determinable by reference to
knowledge of the social realities.
This knowledge, in the sociology of criminal law, takes two especially
important forms--detailed case-histories of specific socio-legal problems
and generalizations, some of which can be stated in very precise terms.
The first type of study may be of a specific decision or law or legal
change, while the latter take the form of trends, e.g., in the evolution
of penal law or of descriptions of co-variation, e.g., of prosecution for
certain offenses in relation to certain other variables.
Related to the sociology of criminal law is the cultural history of that
law which would provide not only distinctive knowledge of specific
changes but also serve the purposes of legal sociology by providing
data with reference to which apt generalizations could be discovered.
Such a history would take account of philosophical, scientific and
ideological thought which has influenced penal law, as well as of
economic and political changes. It would raise pertinent questions regarding the comparison of the penal law of democratic societies with
that of dictatorships.
As was previously indicated, in terms of the above theory of criminal
law any research into treatment or punishment should take account of
the relation of the sanction to the harm committed and of that between
the harm and the criminal conduct. Research on treatment and punishment should also be venturesome. For example, in many countries the
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employment of children between twelve and sixteen seems relevant to
a relatively low rate of juvenile delinquency. Without prejudging this,
the hypothesis should be explored regardless of our strong preference
for universal compulsory education. Thoughtful questions are being
asked about juvenile courts, and there is concern for the deprivation
of the children's legal rights. But it is extremely difficult to alter the
culturally dominant factors which limit the inculcation of social responsibility in children; and apparently little research on this important
problem is being done.
What looms large in the current penological, horizon are proposals
to incarcerate many so-called "anti-social" persons alleged to be recognizable before they commit any crime and to institutionalize many other
thousands of convicted persons until psychiatrists certify that they have
been "cured." The fact is that such penology rests upon an ideology,
not upon diagnosis or knowledge of rehabilitation. 'What might also
be discovered about the probable implementation of such proposals if
an investigation into the conditions of mental hospitals were undertaken, is indicated in the statement of a thoughtful .psychiatrist that
some mental hospitals are more punitive in their treatment than are
some penitentiaries in their punishment." •
A theory of penal law which views conduct, harm and sanction in
rational interrelations does not obstruct the expansion of sound methods
of treatment. On the contrary, as was seen with reference to negligent
harm-doing, it would narrow the present range of punishment. It
would also do that in reliance on psychiatric evidence of the internal
conflicts, traumatic experiences, tensions, and abnormalities of personality development in particular cases. There is nothing rigorously
moralistic about a .theory which makes sense of the responsibility of
normal adults, and there is nothing in it that would limit the fullest presentence consideration of the frailty of human nature in trying
circumstances.
In the various ways indicated above, legal psychology, forensic psychiatry, the sociology of 'criminal law and penology contribute to the
clarification and improvement of the criminal law and its administration.
It could be shown, also, that these disciplines depend on the theory, i.e.,
the knowledge, of criminal law to provide the distinctive structure and
content which set them 'apart from general psychology, sociology and
so on. This implies that penal theory and these other socio-legal disciplines comprise a single body of knowledge. The difficulties of the
problems and the limitations of individual scholars necessitate a division
of labor and specialization-in the one case, in the elucidation of the
11 Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 189, 197
n.21 (1958).
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concepts of penal law and, in the other, in the acquisition of empirical
knowledge. But the data of these disciplines have common characteristics and the relevant knowledge is unified by reference to a theory
of criminal law.
If the addition of still another major task to the already onerous
functions of scientific and humane scholarship in this field is permitted,
I would urge the thorough, study of comparative criminal law. The need
for this has long been appreciated in Europe. Indeed, if the desultory,
though significant observations of Montesquieu are passed over, the
pioneer of modern comparative law was Anselm Feuerbach, a scholar
of'criminal law. The first chair of comparative law was that in comparative criminal law established for Ortolan. in 1848 at the University
of Paris. Since then, Continental scholars have become accustomed to
studying the criminal law of various countries in the course of their
research on their own law. That suggests the immediate purpose of
comparative law-to understand one's own law better by viewing it
more objectively and learning in the process not only its relative merits
but also that much that has been taken for granted is challenged or is
non-existent elsewhere. For example, knowledge of the ways in which
wens rea and criminal fault are defined and treated, different rules
regarding criminal attempts, various ways of handling what we call
"burglary" and other specific offenses, the absence of felony-murder,
misdemeanor-manslaughter rules, and of many other differences stimulates a critical appraisal of the criminal law.
Much food for thought can also be supplied by the scholarly Continental literature on criminal law. This is much more extensive than
ours, for, we must remember, in that tradition it is the treatise which
has particularly influenced legal practice. Our need to pursue such
studies in penal law is insistent because the vast majority of our comparatists specialize in private law. It should be added that it is not
only the criminal law and penal theory of other countries that merit
study. The progress of forensic psychiatry, penology and other disciplines would also be accelerated by knowledge of foreign contributions.
There are other valuable goals to be pursued in the comparative
study of criminal law. For example, among democratic countries there
is a wide sharing of values that have been articulated most precisely in
their penal laws. The discovery of this cultural unity would have great
social as well as scientific significance. Indeed, it may be hazarded that
the general progress of comparative law would be accelerated by such
study because scholars of criminal law have long been accustomed to
draw upon the social sciences and the humanities. A related reason for
advancing the comparative knowledge of penal law is the need to provide a viable international law of crimes.
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Finally, it should be noted that the common law of crimes is far from
playing its proper role in the construction of a sound comparative
penal law, as one learns at international meetings. The causes of this
are evident-a shared tradition in private Roman law, the ties and
limitations of language, the influence of easily transplanted Continental
codes, the prestige of scholarly treatises among scholars, and so on.
But criminal law is one of the most important parts of any culture,
and it would seem that the experience of the Anglo-American peoples
especially in this area is worth studying, as is implied, e.g., in the current interest of the Italian government in revising their criminal procedure along Anglo-American lines. It is the common law scholar who,
of course, has the primary duty to communicate this knowledge to his
civilian colleagues.
This lecture has covered considerable ground and it has been impossible to give any of its subjects due attention. It has seemed to me
that a discussion inaugurating this series of annual lectures under the
hospitable auspices of Boston University School of Law might serve
its purpose in surveying the field and in attempting, also, to organize
its far-ranging, apparently diverse subdivisions by reference to a theory
of criminal law. Even a specific problem of criminal law raises many
questions; and, while the criminal law is not yet as jealous a mistress
as one might hope for, those who would prosper in her service must
be men "for all seasons," even though they fall far short of the universality of St. Thomas More.
Far-ranging and difficult as are the problems of criminal law, there
are many incentives for scholars who are sensitive to the issues of their
times to do even better than their best work. For in this very special
century, it is no bit of rhetoric to say that civilization seems at times
to totter on the brink of barbarism. The effort to maintain the dominance of reason and decency over passion and destructiveness must be
carried on patiently and persistently, with all the resources we can
summon. In this struggle, the criminal law has a major contribution
to make, one which cannot be made by any other institution. It is a
social treasure of inestimable value, expressing the better side of human
nature even in the stress of a precarious situation.
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